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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a review of the People’s Republic of
China’s (PRC) nuclear warfare development and uranium
mining programs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region. Its scope spans from PRC’s first nuclear weapon test
in Lop Nur during the early Cold War, to the contemporary
issues surrounding in-situ leach uranium mining in the Yili
basin which now provides a third of PRC’s uranium. By explor-
ing these scenarios, it is possible to place a lens on the para-
meters and limitations to indigenous Uyghur life within
a nuclear state. This paper draws on the work of Achille
Mbembe’s necropolitics, whereby power is persistently exer-
cised as violence, to consider the entangled aftermath of
nuclear imperialism and its harmful consequences to Uyghur
bodies, environment and culture. While racialized nuclear
imperialism presented Uyghur lives as inconsequential to
industrial and military progress in Xinjiang, post-Cold War
necropolitics presents Uyghur culture as a direct threat to the
progress and values of the PRC sovereign state. This paper
proposes that the ongoing exploitation of nuclear Xinjiang
provides an additional motivation for state-imposed necropo-
litical sanctions upon Uyghur people. This paper also presents
a new theoretical contribution, the “nuclear imperialism-
necropolitics nexus”, which offers a way to consider the legacy
of injustice of spaces of nuclear activity, from nuclear imperi-
alism to the post-Cold War world.�
� � ��
Introduction
This paper expands upon existing understandings of injustices perpetuated by
the sovereign state in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC); to encompass notions of nuclear imperialism and
necropolitics, which have been drawn together to present a “nuclear imperi-
alism-necropolitics nexus”. I argue that the colonization of Uyghur lands and
their use by the PRC for nuclear weapon testing are representative of a mode
of nuclear imperialism that treated Uyghur life as worthless. However, this
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older form of power has since been folded into a new form of necropolitics,
whereby Uyghur life has become all too consequential. Uyghur people and
their traditional way of life have now become the target of destruction. While
retaining nuclear weapon possessor status, the PRC is now in the midst of
a nuclear energy renaissance and currently has the world’s largest nuclear
energy development program. Commercial nuclear energy was not a priority
for the PRC until 2005, due to a lack of political and economic incentives
during the Cold War, and an abundance of other national energy sources
including coal-fired power stations and hydroelectric power (Zhou et al.
2011). This means that spaces of injustice that were originally associated
with nuclear-weapons testing are now being reasserted for energy rather
than warfare, with repercussions to Uyghur.
Research has been undertaken to examine how nuclear technologies inter-
act across a spectrum of geographic scales, encompassing zones, communi-
tiesand bodies (Alexis-Martin and Davies 2017; Pitkanen and Farish 2018). This
field has been described as nuclear geography, and its key concerns are the
benefits and challenges that emerge as humans coexist with spaces of nuclear
phenomena including warfare, energy and medicine. Prior work notes that
nuclear technology changes the nature of power’s relationship to geographical
space, as militarization or industrialization affects the local landscape and
community (Alexis-Martin and Davies 2017; Anderson et al. 2019). This change
in power is associated with racialization, changed mobilities and environmen-
tal (in)justices. Thus, the nuclear imperialism-necropolitics nexus provides
a new framework for drawing together past, present and future human-
nuclear issues.
An important historical aspect of the nuclear imperialism-necropolitics
nexus is nuclear imperialism. This is characterized by the capitalist formation,
intervention and militarization of space, and by the ideological, cultural and
material domination of one group, nation-state, or ideology by another,
through nuclear means (Broinowski 2015). Nuclear imperialism arises due to
the economic and spatial needs created by nuclear weapons and energy, as
resources such as uranium are exploited, or spaces become militarized for
nuclear weapon development and testing. The consequences of nuclear
imperialism have been considered internationally, with studies including
Ghana, the USA and the South Pacific (Allman 2008; Keown 2018; Alexis-
Martin 2019). Much of this prior research focuses on places that have been
subject to Western colonization, creating a body of work that reveals
a historical global network of injustice with ongoing repercussions, but that
neglects to consider other spaces of colonization that are disconnected from
the British Empire or the USA.
A significant contemporary element of the nuclear imperialism-necropolitics
nexus is necropolitics. Mbembe’s Necropolitics elucidates that, “ . . . race has
been the ever present shadow in Western political thought and practice”
(2003, 17). Clearly, this shadow of exclusion is not just confined to Western
politics but also manifests itself in the contemporary racialization of Uyghur
people in Xinjiang. As Uyghur spaces are dominated by nuclear activities for
a second time, the nuclear has become inseparable from the technologies-of-
control pertaining to race and power, inscribing harmful new sets social and
spatial relations on Uyghur people (Mbembe 2003; Foucault 1997). There are
parallels between this long-term environmental racism and its necropolitical
consequences in Xinjiang, and non-nuclear scenarios in the West. For example,
studies have considered slow violence, necropolitics and petrochemical pollu-
tion in the Deep South USA; and have contemplated environmental racism as
state-sanctioned racial violence and racialized capitalism in “multicultural cor-
porate America” (Davies 2018; Pulido 2017, 527).
I argue that the Uyghur experience of environmental racism is extensive and
extreme. I also posit that the post-Cold War Uyghur lifeworld has become the
target of assault by the PRC, producing insidious forms of bare life (Agamben
1998; Habermas 2015). This is firstly due to historic nuclear imperialist neglect
of indigenous communities in the PRC, and secondly, due to the actively
necropolitical nature of ongoing environmental racism and cultural oppres-
sion. The PRC state vision of the Uyghur future currently is one that represents
a secular ethnic group, thus restive Uyghur Muslim populations present
a sense of existential threat to the social, cultural and economic aims of the
PRC. Consequently, the PRC has undertaken oppressive measures to destroy
the cultural aspects of Uyghur life (Habermas 2015). The UNHRC reported that
“ . . . the arbitrary detentions and the extensive use of surveillance technologies
on Uyghurs violated their basic rights” (UNHRC, 2018). These acts create a state
of exception and remove the possibility of an unhampered Uyghur lifeworld,
which was previously constrained but intact, despite the consequences of Cold
War nuclear imperialism.
Reports by international media including CNN, The Guardian and Quartz
have described how Uyghur cultural figures have died whilst under detention,
although limits on international scholarship and journalism in Xinjiang bring
into question the reliability of these sources (Roberts 2018). On the
19 June 2019, The Guardian reported on the death of prominent Uighur writer
Nurmuhammad Tohti after being held in one of Xinjiang’s internment camps
(Flood 2019). Prior to this, on February 2019, Quartz reported on the death of
Uyghur poet and musician Abdurehim Heyit (Mollman 2019). This report
declared that Turkey had lodged an unusual official protest over China’s
Uygur detention camps after Heyit’s death, and described how the Turkish
foreign ministry spokesperson Hami Aksoy said “It is no longer a secret that
more than one million Uighur Turks incurring arbitrary arrests are subjected to
torture and political brainwashing in internment camps and prisons” (Mollman
2019). Through a legacy of instrumentalization described across this paper,
Uyghur experience has gradually become more necropolitical. It is also
entangled with Agembe’s notions of homo sacer, as Uyghur communities are
now in “ . . . a continuous relationship with the power that banished him
precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat
of death” (Agamben 1998). If international media reports are to be believed,
then Uyghur homo sacer is subject to a state of exception by the means of
state re-education and can be killed with impunity as a sacrificial object, whose
death can be used to extend sovereign power.
Necropolitics is inherently a politics of death, whereby the state decides
who will live and who must die, to create death worlds rather than lifeworlds
(Mbembe 2003). It presents a framework to understand the instrumentalization
of human existence, through the control of the lives and deaths of the
subjugated, and the material destruction of human bodies and populations.
The exercise of necropolitical power is in the taking away of “home”, “body”,
and “political status”, and in the direct “use” of lives (Mbembe 2003). Thus, it
has previously provided relatable and relevant insights into how internment
camps divest their inhabitants of political status and reduce them to a bare life
(Mbembe 2003); and how the self-immolation of Tibetan monks can be under-
stood as claiming agency over their own bodies to gain political status (Makley
2015�). Necropolitics also gives insights into how unregulated toxic chemicals
create “death-worlds”, and how those who live with pollution experience these
in temporally uncertain and constricting ways (Davies 2018). Thus, environ-
mental racism arises from racial capitalism, when we consider the intersection
between the long-term racialized oppression of Uyghur people and the use of
their lands for nuclear weapon tests and uranium extraction (Pulido 2017).
This paper presents a reflective review of nuclear activity across Xinjiang,
which centers on the multifarious ways that sovereign power has dominated
and racialized Uyghur environments, culture and bodies. It provides
a theoretical contribution to geography by considering the transition from
nuclear imperialism to necropolitics, in the Uyghur context. The next section of
this paper introduces the Uyghur people and provides an overview of relevant
challenges faced by this community in Xinjiang. This is followed by a section
that contemplates the impacts of Cold War nuclear imperialism to Uyghurs.
This paper then explores entanglements between nuclear imperialism and
necropolitics in Xinjiang, before turning to the complex and entwined con-
temporary necropolitical action against Uyghurs and its connections to eco-
nomic and cultural development in the region. This paper concludes with an
overview of the racially uneven nature of (in)justice that has arisen in Xinjiang,
from the Lop Nor nuclear weapon tests to the present day.
Introducing Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is a vast area of arid deserts and moun-
tains in China, with an estimated population of 24.5 million people (Howell
and Fan 2011). Xinjiang forms part of the Silk Road, bordering Kazakhstan,
Russia, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India
(Grabot 1996). Among its multi-ethnic population are Uyghurs – who are one
of 56 ethnic groups described by Minsu ethnonational categorization nation-
ally (Xu’ai 2014). The Uyghur people are of Turkic Muslim origin and have been
indigenous to Xinjiang for millennia (Tursun 2008). As such, the Uygurs form
a unique Uyghur nation with its own homeland, history, habitus, Muslim
religion, culture and language (Bovingdon 2010). However, this indigenous
historical narrative is subject to ongoing contestation and disruption by China,
who instead assert their sovereignty and dispute Uyghur indigenous territorial
rights (Gladney 1998; Dillon 2002; Grose 2015). Thus, Xinjiang remains colo-
nized, and Uyghur people contest the dominance of the Han state and its
desire for a culturally homogenous people. Cultural homogeneity has pro-
gressed rapidly due to state-instigated Han migration. Between 1949 and
2008, the proportion of Han in Xinjiang rose dramatically from 6.7%
(220,000) to 40% (8.4 million) (Howell and Fan 2011). For the subaltern
Uyghur, the Han state aspiration for a universally secular and educated middle-
class has been experienced as a process of Han occupation and suppression of
Uyghur cultural identity by “re-education” (Gladney 1998).
Uyghur oppression is not a contemporary phenomenon. For 2,500 years, the
region has broken away from China repeatedly. This space and its people were
occupied by China’s Qing dynasty in the eighteenth century and the region
was renamed Xinjiang, meaning New Frontier (Swanström 2002). Xinjiang
became a passageway for trade, and its borders with Kazakhstan and
Pakistan have shaped its economic, cultural and political identity. While
Uyghur independent rule arose in the 1930s and 1940s, it was not centrally
planned and coordinated, and was characterized by interethnic competition
and Soviet military support. In 1949, following victory in the Chinese Civil War,
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took control of Xinjiang and absorbed it
into the newly formed People’s Republic of China. A Han migration program
began in 1950, prior to the designation of Xinjiang as a Uyghur autonomous
region on the 1 October 1955 (Dillon 1997). Following its creation, there was
an exodus of approximately 60,000 Uyghur and Kazakh people and their cattle
to the Soviet Union from April to May 1962, in response to overarching cultural
changes and the Han influx (Millward 2004). By the mid-1960s, nuclear weapon
testing had begun in Xinjiang, and nuclear imperialism had emerged from
existing Han colonization of Uyghur space.
Cold war nuclear imperialism
The PRC’s actions toward Uyghur people in Xinjiang can be examined through
the lens of nuclear imperialism. Nuclear imperialism has been used to describe
scenarios where one state dominates another for nuclear purposes, such as
French nuclear weapon testing in Algeria, or British nuclear weapon testing in
the South Pacific during the Cold War (Alexis-Martin and Davies 2017). It is also
a pertinent description of nuclear activities that are undertaken in the con-
tested homelands of indigenous peoples, such as the historic consequences of
uranium mining in the USA (Malin and Petrzelka 2010). The Uyghur community
have experienced nuclear imperialism due to: contestations that surround the
sovereignty of their homelands, the isolated and resource-rich nature of the
space that they inhabit that has been claimed by the PRC, and the ideological
differences that arise between their own and the state’s sense of imagined
community and national identity (Anderson 1991). China’s state-sponsored
national, regional, and nuclear site borders and zones have been imposed,
affecting the geo-body of both Uyghur people and the state (Gladney 1998).
Xinjiang was selected to play a part in China’s nuclear-weapons testing
during the early 1960s. For 50 years, this space and its people have been
affected by its place at the center of China’s nuclear ambitions. China was the
fifth nation to develop nuclear weapons during the Cold War, following the
collapse of the Sino-Soviet nuclear relationship (McLane 1973). The PRC’s
nuclear defense development began in earnest after the Sino-Soviet split
had annulled any residual myth of monolithic communism. Uranium mining
for China’s atomic bomb was first undertaken in Tibet before resources were
discovered in Xinjiang (Evans 1962). It is not insignificant that Tibet, a still-
contested geography, played a vital role in the nuclear history of the PRC.
Tibetan mining demonstrates how nuclear technology has long been linked to
imperialism and the occupation of territory. The PRC established its first set of
uranium mines and a milling plant, and large-scale military uranium prospect-
ing projects were soon initiated in Xinjiang (�Zhang and Bai�2015�). In 1958, the
Chinese settlement №404 Factory of China National Nuclear Corp was covertly
built to refine plutonium and produce the components for nuclear weapons at
the Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant (Bonnett 2014). By June 1959, formal
nuclear cooperation between the two communist states had ceased, but the
PRC had decided to continue to pursue ownership of the atomic bomb with-
out Soviet support (Jersild 2013). China formally established the 100,000 Km2
Lop Nor Nuclear Test Base on the 16 October 1959, and it is still the largest site
of its kind in the world (Norris 1996).
At 3 pm on the 16 October 1964, the PRC undertook its first successful
atomic bomb test at Lop Nor testing ground. A communiqué from Beijing
asserted to the rest of the world that “The success of China’s nuclear test is
a major achievement of the Chinese people in the strengthening of their
national defense and the safeguarding of their motherland, as well as
a major contribution by the Chinese people to the cause of the defense of
world peace” (Topping 1964). Despite US and Soviet apprehensions, this was
the dawn of a new era of nuclear defense for the PRC. A further 22 atmo-
spheric and 22 underground nuclear weapon tests were performed over the
next 32 years in Lop Nur across Areas A (Nanshan); B (Qinggir); C (Beishan); and
D (Drop Area) (Roberts, Manning, and Montaperto 2000). Nanshan was used
for tunnel-based tests, Quinggir was the site of 13 underground tests, Beishan
is located to the southwest of Quinggir and was used for two underground
tests in 1969 and 1976, and the Drop Area is located south-east of Quinggir
and was the site of atmospheric tests until 16 October 1980 (Roberts, Manning,
and Montaperto 2000).
While the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 marked the end of the Cultural
Revolution and ushered in a change in leadership focused on economic market
liberalization and industrialization, the Lop Nor test facility remained uncom-
promised and unaffected by local activism (Millward 2004; Sovacool and
Valentine 2010). A final underground tunnel test was undertaken at Area
A in Lop Nur on the 29 July 1996, although there is some evidence that further
underground tests were conducted in 2001 (Mian, Nayyar, and Ramana 2018).
This final official test occurred just prior to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) opening for signatories, on the 24 September 1996 (UN, 2019). China is
a CTBT and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NNP) treaty participant but has yet to
ratify the CTBT, a step that is mandatory for the Treaty’s entry into force. It
retains an estimated arsenal of 280 nuclear warheads (Kristensen and Norris
2018). China’s nuclear weapon tests have had long-term implications for
residents of Xinjiang, especially Uyghur people: the loss of their homelands
and traditional way of life, environmental degradation, and health-related
challenges (Roberts, Manning, and Montaperto 2000). All tests were under-
taken across Uyghur homelands, exemplifying an aspect of internal colonialism
to which Uyghur people have been subjected (Gladney 1998).
Lop Nor stands out among the most heavily contaminated nuclear weapon
test sites, as airburst tests conducted during 1964–1980 exposed swathes of
Xinjiang and eastern Kazakhstan to isotopes (Yamamoto et al. 2004). A study
undertaken by Professor Jun Takada suggests that peak levels of radioactivity
from the PRC’s large-yield tests could have seriously affected local populations
(Takada 2008). It is estimated that due to the prolonged nuclear weapon
testing at Lop Nor, cancer incidence in the province is approximately
30–35% higher than the state average (Merali 2009; Prăvălie 2014). PRC health
data relating to Lop Nor have not been independently verified and is challen-
ging to access outside of the state. However, journalists and medics have
described a serious health legacy for Uyghurs in the areas surrounding the
Lop Nor test site (Brown 1993; Merali 2009; Zeeya 2009). This includes
a reported increase in cancer and congenital defects for children who live
nearby the site since the 1970s, including tumors, leukemia and cleft palates,
described by Dr Laura Watson to the Independent (Buncombe 1998).
A Channel 4 Dispatches documentary attempted to learn more about possible
health effects to this community (Death on the Silk Road 1999). This film
showed a team of doctors and film-makers covertly posing as tourists in an
attempt to assess the medical consequences of nuclear weapon testing in PRC.
The filmmakers interviewed local doctors and offered medical services to the
affected community, while illicitly collecting medical records to understand the
health impacts. It revealed an impoverished community who have been
affected by birth defects and health problems. While health data are limited,
conditions for Uyghur people in the PRC mirror those of the indigenous
communities in Kazakhstan and Australia who were subject Soviet and UK
nuclear weapon tests and later experienced health effects (Alexis-Martin 2019).
In total, it is estimated that 60,000 people were exposed, many of whom would
have been Uyghurs (Simon and Bouville 2002). However, it is difficult to ascertain
whether the health effects they experienced are due to hereditary genetic muta-
tions or to exposure to a contaminated environment (Alexis-Martin 2019). These
issues are compounded by poor access to medical care, social services and neces-
sary information about radiation health effects. Uygur traditional medicine is
derived from Unani practices and is not adapted to treat any health challenges
that may potentially arise from radiation exposure. Eyewitness accounts are limited
but corroborate the existing literature. A Uyghur resident of Hiroshima Prefecture in
Japan described his experience of living near Lop Nor, revealing that “In around
1989 and 1990, once or twice a year the sky darkened and pillows of sand and
smoke grew, making me realise that they were conducting nuclear tests . . . . I went
to the atomic bombing museum and learned for the first time that they could have
an impact on human bodies” (Japan Times 2012). As witnesses to the destruction of
their homes by the entangled relations of nuclear imperialism, first-nation indigen-
ous representatives have demanded recognition of their prior ownership of lands
and restitution for the damage done (Habermas 2015; Broinowski 2015).
For the Uyghur community, contestation and state assurances surrounding
health risks serve to blur causation between exposure and illness, while a bio-
political regime shields the state and investors from liability (Broinowski 2015).
No state compensation is forthcoming for down-winder Uyghur civilians who
have been affected by the Lop Nor tests. Only Han former military personnel of
the 8023 Force have received any support from the state for health problems
that have arisen as a result of their work (Zeeya 2009). This imbalanced
treatment only serves to strengthen tensions between the two communities.
In November 1985, Uyghur students in Beijing undertook peaceful protests
against the nuclear weapon tests (Dillon 200�2),�which extended across
Xinjiang’s universities and colleges. The Urumchi student protest took place
on 12 December 1985, as local universities also undertook peaceful protest.
This included action in Kashgar (Kashi), Aqsu (Akesu), Hotan (Hetian), and
Bortala (Bole), as approximately 15,000 students from different ethnic back-
grounds participated (Rozinisa 2019). These peaceful protests had clear aims.
Firstly, to promote democratic election in Xinjiang. Secondly, to stop the
nuclear weapon tests. The third main aim was to stop Xinjiang serving as
a large labor camp for China and to prevent unplanned immigration from
other parts of China. Other aims included the implementation of autonomous
law in Xinjiang, the elimination of one-child policy for Uyghur Muslims, and to
develop cultural education across the region (Rozinisa 2019). Mr Aziz Isa Elkun,
a nuclear test survivor from nearby Lop Nor who now lives in the UK, described
his priorities as follows “ . . . to stop the nuclear tests, to stop implementing
cultural genocide, to improve cultural education, and create equal rights with
Han people” (Elkun 2019). When we spoke, he described to me how he
produced a poster at high school as part of this peaceful movement, and
how he was incarcerated by police for “ . . . a few days”, after his role in activism
against PRC state was discovered. This small push-back against oppressive
policies had some serious long-term implications for him as an adult, as he
was later oppressed by state (Elkun 2019).
A serious incident occurred in 1989 when hundreds of Uyghur nationalists
stormed Xinjiang’s Great Hall of the People to demand greater political free-
dom and an end to nuclear weapon testing (Rodríguez 2013). In 1993, over
a thousand people converged at Lop Nor to demand that the tests end, but
they were shot at by PLA soldiers as the scene descended into violence, and
vehicles and equipment were damaged (Dillon 2004). The most spectacular
violence involved an organization called The Tigers of Lop Nor, who reportedly
managed to blow up two airplanes and a number of tanks inside a nuclear
zone (Grabot 1996). In the wake of the Strike Hard campaign of summer 1996,
the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan moved to support China’s
clampdown on Uyghur separatists. The leader of Uyghur separatist group
Attan, Amantay Asilbekov, was warned to stay at home on 28th June during
the visit of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Almaty, as his group had
planned to stage a demonstration against China’s nuclear test program at Lop
Nor .�In this socio-political environment, a Uyghur identity has emerged that
has pushed back against Han nationalism to create a separatist and anti-
nuclear movement. This represents the Uyghur’s determination not to be
ignored, despite challenges arising since the early Cold War. It is notable that
Beijing finally ended nuclear weapon tests in 1996 due to international diplo-
matic pressures, rather than because of pressure from Uyghurs.
Proximity has meant that Uyghurs have witnessed the unshackling of their
post-Cold War ethnic counterparts from their respective nuclear states, which
has encouraged them to seek freedom from the dominant Han state and retain
sovereign status (Bovingdon 2004, 2010). For states such as Kazakhstan, post-
Soviet re-bordering and sovereignty also meant voluntarily surrendering their
prior nuclear weapon possessor status. Since 8 September 2006, some of these
states have been part of a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ)
abutting Xinjiang, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Graham
2017). The PRC issued a statement on security assurances on 5 April 1995
that clarified a no-first-use policy, and specified non-use against any non-
nuclear weapon states or nuclear-free zones (UN, 1995). Notably, the PRC
specifically provided a letter on 8 February 1995 to Kazakhstan that stated “ . . .
The Chinese Government has unconditionally undertaken not to use or threa-
ten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear
weapon-free zones. This long-standing principled position also applies to
Kazakhstan . . . ” (UN 1995). This no-first-use statement was the first of its
kind and demonstrated an awareness of both contemporaneous international
nuclear geopolitics and the concerns of bordering nuclear-free and non-
nuclear weapon possessor states. The presence of the CANWFZ also contrasts
the nuclear statuses of nearby Pakistan and India, both of whom possess
nuclear weapons. It is notable that while the PRC joined the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, it still supplied warhead design informa-
tion and fissile for the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1980s
(Zhu 1997). Xinjiang, therefore, occupies a crucial strategic position, providing
a buffer between the PRC and nuclear Pakistan, India and Russia.
From nuclear imperialism to necropolitics
The aftermath of nuclear imperialism in Lop Nor is well explained by
Mbembe’s theory of necropolitics (Mbembe 2003). The actions of the PRC in
its control and subjugation of Uyghur people can be well described by his
description of “weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction
of persons and the creation of ‘death-worlds’ . . . ” (Mbembe 2003, 40), referring
to a “phantom-like” form of existence in which vast populations are subjected
to the power of the state over their life and death. He also writes that “the
extraction and looting of natural resources by war machines goes hand in
hand with brutal attempts to immobilize and spatially fix whole categories of
people” or even “to unleash them, to force them to scatter over broad areas no
longer contained by the boundaries of a territorial state” (Mbembe 2003, pg.,
34), which aptly portrays some of the impacts of PRC exploitation of Xinjiang,
and it’s subjugation of the people who live there. Necropolitics, therefore,
provides the theoretical tools to understand the conditions that are imposed
upon those who were exposed to contamination or forced to flee their homes,
due to the Lop Nor nuclear weapon tests.
The exclusion of Uyghur people from state acceptance has been robustly
depicted as an expression of Foucault’s biopolitics, whereby this community
symbolizes an almost biological threat to Chinese society that must be man-
aged by surveillance, punishment, and detention (Foucault 1997; Roberts
2018). Foucault’s living theories of biopower can be expanded upon to include
the thinking of Achille Mbembe, who provides a powerful postcolonial critique
of contemporary subjugation and the persistence of necropolitical regimes
(Mbembe 2003). Whereas Foucault contends that “killing or the imperative to
kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but
in the elimination of a biological threat . . . to the species or race” (Foucault
1997). I argue that the threats that the PRC perceives in Xinjiang are not just
cultural, but also economic and political, and its actions against Uyghurs are
distinctively necropolitical.
The politics of death, whereby state decides who will live and who must die, is
well suited to understanding the nuclear history and current fate of Uyghurs in an
era of banal securitization and terror. Mbembe posits that “To exercise sovereignty
is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and
manifestation of power” (Mbembe 2003, 12). In the context of Uyghur people,
their experiences are disciplinary, biopolitical and necropolitical, embedded by
the state within shifting states of terror. A politics of cultural tokenism and social
disposability surrounds Uyghurs. A racialized PRC protects Han economic and
cultural interests while superficially celebrating Uyghur culture, yet simulta-
neously interring Uyghurs in cultural re-education camps (Giroux 2006; Zenz
2018). The damaged bodies of Uyghurs who have been affected by nuclear-
weapons testing, uranium extraction, and interment do just not speak with
directness to the state of PRC racist violence but reveal and shatter illusions of
racial equity in this region (Giroux 2006).
Recent state investment into nuclear energy projects is affecting Uyghurs by
extending existing zones of exclusion, and reviving the contested nature of
their homelands. In the 1990s, a civil nuclear energy renaissance coincided
with a revival of nationalist sentiments, as both Soviet and Baltic states gained
independence from their overarching prior state conglomerates (Budryte
2017). The high-profile nature of these events empowered other nationalist
movements to gain independence and facilitated greater NGO intervention on
the behalf of indigenous peoples (Bovingdon 2010). The events precipitated by
the collapse of the Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan gaining independence,
meant that some Uyghurs gained the confidence to push for recognition of
their collective identity. While they lacked the power to separate from the
state, they found means to contest and challenge PRC state-building and
undertake parallel representational politics (Bovingdon 2010). Three prominent
Uyghur community leaders were killed between 1998 and 2001, but violent
incidents within Xinjiang remained rare from 2001 to until 2008 (Millward
2004; Hastings 2011). Any violence may have been limited by increased
securitization in the region during this time, potentially due to measures
following an increased perception of threat from Muslim communities, includ-
ing Uyghurs, after 9/11 initiated the Global War on Terror (GWOT) (�Roberts
2012; Roberts 2018). However, the Ürümqi riots on 5 July 2009 saw clashes
between protesting Uyghurs, Han people, and China’s People’s Armed Police,
leaving nearly 200 people dead in Xinjiang (Cliff 2012). At least 40 people are
reported to have disappeared during police sweeps in the days after the riots
(Bristow 2019�; Riley 2009). These scenarios provide demonstrable evidence of
necropolitical rule over Uyghurs by the PRC.
Economic renaissance
A key motivation for the contemporary regional oppression of Uyghurs is
Xinjiang’s ongoing strategic and economic importance. It is rich in resources
and products, including oil, cotton, gas and tomatoes, and it forms a buffer
against the West (NEA and IAEA 2016; Costa and Heuvelink 2018).�Importantly,
Xinjiang has become a place of civil nuclear industry, having reportedly placed
a moratorium on fissile material production for nuclear deterrence (Zhang
2017). Uranium mining and milling constitute the first phase of any nuclear-
weapons program but are also essential for nuclear energy production. The
PRC now derives a third of their uranium for nuclear energy from domestic
extraction in the Yili basin of Xinjiang (�OECD 2011; WNA 2019). The PRC is now
working to ensure the use of Xinjiang spaces for civil nuclear energy in the
form of uranium extraction and the future creation of a deep geological
nuclear repository for PRCs nuclear waste. Meanwhile, the Red Mountain
Institute defense laboratory continues to undertake nuclear research at the
Northwest Institute for Nuclear Technology (NINT), to the north of the Lop Nor
test site (NTI 2019).�This has raised new issues have emerged surrounding the
ongoing exclusion and detainment of Uyghurs.
The pursuit of civil nuclear industry in Xinjiang has extended and changed the
nature of the necropolitical control of Uyghur people that began with military
nuclear weapon testing. The PRC undertook an initial step toward nuclear renais-
sance in the 1980s as a shift occurred from military to civilian nuclear industrial
activity, while a military-civil nuclear partnership remained (Zhang and Bai 2015).
In 1980, the Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant began to produce uranium for
civilian purposes. By 1984, the Jiuquan military reactor was closed, and the Daya
Bay reactor deal for the purchase of two French reactors was signed. However,
nuclear ambitions remained modest during the 1980s. In 1987 the Heping gas-
eous diffusion plant ended highly enriched uranium production, and in 1991 the
PRC closed the Guangyan plutonium production reactor. Uranium exploration
was at a historic low (Zhang and Bai 2015).
When the military nuclear activity was de-prioritized, domestic uranium
exploration and mining diminished from 1986 to 2003. The PRC became
a signatory on both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and CTBT (Zhang and
Bai 2015). Its nuclear sector remained in a shrinking and adjustment phase. In
the 2000s, however, the PRC’s military-oriented nuclear program transitioned
to meet increasing energy demands and to reduce carbon emissions. In
March 2006, China’s State Council approved the “Medium and Long-term
Nuclear Power Development Plan (2005–2020)”, which aimed to increase the
PRC’s nuclear capacity to about 40 GWe by 2020 (Zhou et al. 2011). In
March 2009, the PRC demonstrated its commitment to peaceful nuclear energy
by relocating the nuclear energy division of the State Administration of
Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) to a newly
established National Energy Bureau (NEB), and by implementing policies to
encourage the growth of the nuclear economy. While PRC civilian nuclear
energy is providing a welcome economic boost and employing a growing
workforce, some concerns remain around public participation, and its trans-
parency, regulation and management (DiMoia 2018).
This energy renaissance has significantly increased uranium exploration and
extraction activities, with investment tripling between 2004 to 2012 (Zhang and
Bai 2015). Exploration has been undertaken in geologically suitable regions with the
capacity of in-situ leaching of uranium, including Xinjiang. There are currently 13
mines and six mills in operation, with estimated domestic uranium resources of
366,200 tons of uranium (tU) as of 2016 (NEA and IAEA 2016; Hibbs 2018).�China is
a uranium-rich country, and domestic uranium provides a third of the PRC’s supply,
with the remaining two-thirds sourced through the international market or from
PRC-owned mines in Namibia, Niger and Kazakhstan (Hibbs 2018; DeBoom 2018).
The 2016 Red Book identifies 366,000 tU in 21 deposits across 13 provinces, 39% of
the total in Inner Mongolia, 21% in Jiangxi, 14% in Xinjiang and 12% in Guangdong
(WNA 2019). CNNC’s Geological Survey Bureau and the Beijing Research Institute of
Uranium Geology are the key organizations involved with a massive increase in
exploration effort since 2000. Extraction activities include those of uranium
resources discovered in Xinjiang’s Yili Basin in 2008, where the Yining (or Kujiltai) in-
situ leach (ISL) mine produces 380 tU/year, operated by China National Uranium
Corporation (CNUC or CUC), a subsidiary of CNNC (Hanham et al. 2018). A subsidiary
setup in 2006, China Guangdong Nuclear Uranium Resources Co Ltd (CGN-URC),
has been undertaking uranium exploration in Xinjiang, and announced that it was
developing two 500 tU/year mines in this region in 2013 (WNA 2019). PRC uranium
demand is anticipated to grow by 7.69% per year, until domestic uranium produc-
tion peaks in 2065 (Fang et al. 2018).
Due to regional regulatory arbitrage and no overarching nuclear legislation
currently being in place in PRC, there are few incentives for rigorous monitoring
and safety programs at the “internal colony” based uranium extraction sites, such
as Xinjiang’s Yili Basin.�The “2003 Law on the People’s Republic of China on the
Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution” specifies that state council
environmental protection authorities are required to supervise and inspect mea-
sures to prevent radioactive pollution at nuclear facilities and during the devel-
opment of uranium mines (�OECD, 2011; Patton Schell 2014). However, Article 12
of this law holds “units” rather than entities responsible for radioactive pollution,
meaning that if an accident should occur then the blame would fall upon a set of
individuals rather than a corporation or organization (Patton Schell 2014). This
decreases the motivation of organizations such as CNNC to ensure that existing
regulations are followed, reducing protections to workers. Natural uranium
remains unregulated, except in large batches, under existing international agree-
ments. Thus, the exposure and replacement of workers provide a bulwark to
absorb the violence of uranium capital accumulation (Broinowski 2015).
After 2008, the PRC shifted from active to aggressive development. As of
September 2018, China has 44 nuclear reactors in operation and 18 under
construction, and hopes to continue to expand nuclear energy production
until a fifth of its energy originates from nuclear power plants by 2030 (Hibbs
2018; Sheng 2018). While activism in Xinjiang is blamed on nationalism and
Islamism rather than legacy or contemporary activities of the nuclear industry,
anti-nuclear activism is now also arising in the East, in Rushan in Shandong
Province, Lianyungang in Jiangsu Provence, Pengze in Jiangxi Provence and
Jiangmen in Guangdong Provence (Sheng 2018). This activism is occurring due
to community concerns that the environment and health will not be protected
by a cohesive and overarching nuclear energy policy. Anti-nuclear activists use
a combination of resistive media strategies to prevent local nuclear power
plant placement, including online petitions to influence public opinion (Sheng
2018; Gu 2015). However, the xinfang administrative petition system for hear-
ing complaints from individuals in the PRC provides limited influence and
access to governance (Minzner 2006). These communities, therefore, use the
connections of their participants to send their concerns directly to the PRC
central government (Sheng 2018). The PRC engages in censorship to maintain
control over the media, and also uses the internet to collect public information
and strengthen its rule within the Great Firewall (Brady 2017). Petitioners in the
east of China are often well educated and familiar with the political system,
and are able to negotiate local change. The central government will, therefore,
change the location of a nuclear power plant at the expense of less influential
and resistant communities (Sheng 2018). While some communities have
demonstrated empowered and successful mobilization against new nuclear
power plants in their region, they are unconcerned with the successor com-
munities who receive the plant in their stead, and are unaware of the
entangled intranational network whereby new nuclear energy in the East is
fuelled by uranium extraction and milling in the West of the PRC.
Contemporary cultural oppression
It is important to consider the contemporary challenges and contestations of
Uyghur Muslim identity. Twenty years ago, Gladney considered the cultural
implications of nationalist governance in China, questioning what would hap-
pen to “ . . . those citizens on its borders, should a nationalist movement rise up
that sees them as more of a threat, than as a part of China that is multi-
national and multi-ethnic” (Gladney 1998). Increasingly, Uyghurs are portrayed
by the PRC as terrorists who are against state values (Millward 2018).
The universal nature of a perceived Islamist threat, and its intersection with
the Global War on Terror (GWOT), means that it serves as a powerful justifica-
tion for heavy regional securitization in Xinjiang (Roberts 2018). Since 2017,
these measures have included an extensive and punitive political re-education
campaign, involving the widespread surveillance and the detainment of
Uyghur people for re-education (Zenz 2018). The PRC counter-narrative for
this action suggests that it may be winning the “propaganda war”, as many
countries and Muslim organizations have remained silent about this mass
detention (Huang 2019). This recent turn of events is the pinnacle of a long
legacy of state anti-separatism campaigns since the 1930s (Dillon 1997). These
measures are contributing to the cultural genocide of Uyghur people by
depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, and of their cultural
values and ethnic identities (UN 1994; Bewicke 2009).
“Cultural genocide” is described as any action that deprives an ethnic
group’s integrity as distinct individuals or of their cultural values or ethnic
identities. It is any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of
their lands, territories and resources; any form of population transfer that has
the aim of effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; any form of
assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways of life imposed upon
them by legislative, administrative or other measures; or any form of propa-
ganda directed against them (UN 1994). While some aspects of this definition
are enshrined in indigenous peoples’ rights, currently neither the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide nor the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights protects against cultural genocide (Morsink 1999�;
UN 2018). In Xinjiang, in addition to persecution and re-education, cultural
genocide is achieved by flooding Uyghur communities with Han migrants, who
are economically incentivized to migrate to these regions (Côté 2015). The
dominance of Han migrant communities has exacerbated existing ethnic ten-
sions, due to disparities in socioeconomic status and Han dominance of local
economy and politics. Notably, re-education measures since the early 2000s
have made it difficult for young people to resist integration into Han culture,
as all schools in Xinjiang emphasize Chinese language instruction, with all
Uyghur language teaching ceasing at Xinjiang University by 2002 (Grose 2010).
However, a separatist Uyghur identity has persisted that rejects PRC nation-
alism, and that has become increasingly radical as surveillance measures
extend. Uyghur community separatism is not a new phenomenon, and
Uyghurs argue that their attachment to their homelands and their extensive
regional history justify their stance (Gladney 1998). While Uyghur people have
been othered due to their cultural preferences, observable aesthetic and
physiognomic differences between Uyghur and other Chinese citizens create
exigent circumstances whereby Uygur people are biologically set apart from
the rest of the state (Roberts 2018). This means that Uyghurs are easily
stigmatized and targeted for re-education or punishment due to their appear-
ance, regardless of their compliance with Han cultural ideologies.
Although the small number of active Uyghur separatists have remained vastly
outnumbered by the People’s Army and the People’s Police (Zenz 2018), there has
been a significant increase in the frequency and intensity of violent incidents in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the 21st century (Dillon 2018). While
there is limited evidence of widespread Uyghur involvement in either Al Quaeda
or Taliban forces, extensive clandestine de-extremification work has been under-
taken by the PRC. Since Spring 2017, Xinjiang has witnessed the emergence of an
unprecedented re-education campaign, with an estimated one million Uyghurs
and other Muslims being detained by the state (Zenz 2018; Millward 2018; BBC
2019). This has major implications for society, local economies and ethnic rela-
tions, as it removes the opportunity for Uyghurs to be considered anything other
than unlawful and illegitimate (Millward 2018). The justifications for this action by
the PRC stem from the post 9/11 perception of political Islam. Some 22 Uyghurs
were incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay in the aftermath of 9/11, sparking interna-
tional concern about the perceived problems of militant Uyghur Islamism, and its
associations with the Taliban and Al Quaeda (Shichor 2005). Despite those enga-
ging in terrorism not being representative of the vast majority of Uyghur people,
a War on Terror has emerged in the PRC, and efforts were made to suppress
separatism (Giglio 2004). The political oppression of Uyghur people was made
possible by this opportunity to criminalize their ethnicity by representing this
community as being terrorists against the values of the state (Becquelin 2004).
The persecution of Uyghur separatists as terrorists has protected several
economic advantages beyond the nuclear spaces of Xinjiang and has been
described as terror capitalism (Byler 2018). This has been motivated by the
increased neoliberalization of the PRC’s economy and represents a post-
socialist transition. It is evidenced by the way that state-directed economic
investment in the region has been paralleled by further security infrastructure
for managing the presence of Uyghur bodies and ideologies. Surveillance is
physical, electronic and biological. A database of Xinjiang DNA has been
established by requiring genetic samples from all those who apply for pass-
ports (Human Rights Watch 2017; Dillon 2018; Roberts 2018�; UN 2018). This
merging of biological data and electronic surveillance has the aim of protect-
ing state politics and economy, and exceeds anything described in Foucault’s
original articulation of biopolitics (Foucault 1997; Roberts 2018). An increas-
ingly authoritarian politic has emerged in the PRC, governing through eco-
nomic rather than social terms, and operates alongside technologies of
discipline and the power to make live – or die (Giroux 2006). This is demon-
strated by recent decisions made by a Han-dominant local government. Since
the 2016 appointment of Chen Quanguo as Communist Party Secretary,
Xinjiang has become a regional panopticon within a security state (Roberts
2018). This has increased the precarity of an existing bare life for Uyghurs, for
whom life is “constantly rendered in its precariousness, a life that is always
potentially under attack, and therefore always an exceptional life” (Thacker
2011, 158). This bare life is produced for Uyghur people under the threat and
force of economically motivated necropower, which then reproduces the
ongoing justification, normalization, and banality of the PRC’s exceptional
necropolitical rule over Uyghur bodies and lives (Mbembe 2003; Arendt 2002).
Thus, the politics that surrounds Uyghur separatist lives has been embedded in
invisible relations of power under a local regime of exceptional surveillance
and insecurity.
In 2012, China unveiled a plan in collaboration with Beijing’s Tsinghua
University and the local government to turn the Lop Nor nuclear test site
into a “red tourism site”, with funding for this requalification project to make
the location tourist-friendly (BBC 2012). The development of tourism opportu-
nities reflects the increased cultural opportunities and disposable incomes
available to many, as the overarching Chinese economy has boomed. Visitors
will be able to view scientist’s laboratories and a 300-m tunnel that was used
for airstrikes, as part of a program of spaces designated by the PRC to
celebrate its military history (Cappelletti 2015). This appropriation of land by
the PRC for the celebration of its military achievements represents a final
phase of military nuclear imperialism, continuing a legacy of occupation and
control of space, and the subjugation or removal of the people who live there.
Xinjiang remains of strategic value as a buffer zone and for its commodities.
However, it has also featured as a potential site for a future nuclear waste
repository for spent nuclear fuel. Global contestations have occurred regarding
the placement of such repositories internationally, and US and Australian
repository programs have stalled due to long-term safety concerns and nimby-
ism (Apted and Ahn 2017). Since the start of its civilian nuclear power program,
the PRC has pursued an R&D program for a final high-level nuclear waste
(HLW) repository (Brunnengräber et al. 2018). Large civilian nuclear energy
programs generate nuclear waste, and the Northwest Institute for Nuclear
Technology (NINT) in Xinjiang has undertaken research into a potential HLW
repository and underground research laboratory facility (URL) in the region
since 2012 (Di Nucci et al. 2018). The final site selection is still pending but has
been narrowed down to the Aquisha area, nearby to Lop Nor, which has no
permanent residents. There is currently no literature that explores or describes
nomadic residents or the cultural significance of this site. Executive nuclear
waste management legislation is currently uneven, as China has no overarch-
ing legislation that requires nuclear power plant operators to manage nuclear
waste liabilities (Di Nucci et al. 2018). Although nuclear safety issues have
received attention in PRC since Fukushima, there has been less attention to
nuclear waste management. With onsite storage pools reaching their capacity,
the PRC will need more facilities for the safe long-distance transport and offsite
interim storage of spent fuel from 2020 (Brunnengräber et al. 2018).
There is currently cooperation between the US and China on underground
laboratory-based studies, despite the PRC’s concerning human rights track
record in the region (Normile 2009). However, in 2018 the US considered
placing sanctions on PRC due to their treatment of Uyghurs (�UN 2018; Kuo
2018). Sanctions, if any, could be imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act,
which allows the US government to freeze US assets of human rights violators
and prohibit US economic collaboration (Firestone and Contini 2018).
Xinjiang is a core hub of PRC’s nuclear sector, and the PRC seems deter-
mined to pursue an oppressive solution to its challenges surrounding Uyghur
people. Until international intervention arises, Xinjiang remains a necropolitical
space where the “ . . . the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and
redemption, martyrdom and freedom are blurred.” (Mbembe 2003, 40).
Conclusions
The ongoing pursuit of uranium extraction and nuclear waste storage in
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region connects historic nuclear imperialism in
the form of nuclear weapon testing to contemporary nuclear industrial and
state expansion that bears necropolitical traits. The Uyghur people were
originally witnessed to the destruction of their life-worlds during the nuclear
imperialism of the PRC’s Cold War nuclear weapon tests, yet have had their
demands for recognition of their lands and their claims for restitution of
damage ignored. Anti-nuclear activism is not often presented as a central
element of Uyghur political movements, as it has been overshadowed by the
many other injustices that this community has faced in China. However, it does
form an important explanatory element for the PRC’s territorializing and
security practices in Xinjiang.
While reassurances of no-nuclear first use have been recently reaffirmed by
the PRC, it retains an internal population of people who have been harmed by
its historic nuclear experimentation. The value of uranium and its current
contribution to energy generation and carbon emission reduction continue
to be prioritized by the PRC over the collective cultural and material autonomy
and rights of Uyghur people. I suggest that rather than being a comparatively
peripheral issue, the contemporary presence of the renewed nuclear industry
in Xinjiang deserves further scrutiny by human geographers, as it plays
a neglected role in Uyghur activism and land rights contestations.
I argue that the present Uyghur situation in China has arisen due to a troika
of othering, biopolitical surveillance, and necropolitical action that is designed
to gain state control over this community and is associated with the aftermath
of both historic nuclear weapon testing and the GWOT. This is despite the
PRC’s political discourse purporting to support Uyghur culture, while simulta-
neously framing this community as terrorists. Motivations for these conflicted
and complex interactions include the state’s desire to maintain Xinjiang’s
strategic borders and spaces, and thus retain its nuclear geopolitical and
economic advantages.
The decreased instances of violence in Xinjiang and increased surveillance and
cultural re-education in 2016 to 2017 have coincided with a further affirmation of
Xinjiang’s renewed significance as a nuclear region. For instance, accelerated site
selection for a High-Level Waste nuclear repository is ongoing at Yamansu in
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region since 2012 (Wang 2014; Lui and Pan 2016).
The future storage of nuclear waste within indigenous lands that are currently
used for uranium extraction may not sit comfortably with Uyghur people, if this
scenario does arise. There is an urgent need for PRC to reflect upon its current
policies pertaining to indigenous people, to ensure that it does not perpetuate
the second phase of nuclear imperialism. A civil nuclear energy renaissance in the
PRC offers important international economic and climate change mitigation
benefits, but it must not be at the expense of Uyghur people. Uyghur lives have
been instrumentalized for the purposes of sovereign power over life and death.
However, it is difficult to know if this was the intention of state power from the
first moment of nuclear weapon testing, or an unintended consequence of
nuclear imperialism. It may simply be that Uyghur lives did not matter and
continue to not matter, from the perspective of state.
In this paper, I have reviewed the significance of nuclear imperialism, cultural
genocide and necropolitics, offering insights into the ways that nuclear issues are
inherently geopolitical and humanitarian in nature. I explored the geographic links
between historic nuclear imperialism and contemporary necropolitics through the
case of Uyghur-PRC nuclear geographies, which illustrates the existence of a nuclear
imperialism-necropolitics nexus. This paper is not an exhaustive review of the
nuclear geographies of China and offers considerable opportunities for further
development. The nuclear imperialism-necropolitics nexus also provides
a framework for examining and analyzing events occurring outside of Xinjiang.
This includes the development of nuclear energy in the East of the PRC, but it also
extends across the Eurasian region to the consideration of uranium mining in
Kazakhstan, and to the nuclear weapon and energy geopolitics of Russia, India
and Pakistan. It has transnational implications beyond Eurasia, to anywhere that has
a legacy of nuclear weapon testing and nuclear energy development.
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